THE suggestion that I discuss the role of epidemiology in the planning and operation of Regional Medical Programs came as something of a shock to me. It happens that I am neither a regional expert, a medical expert, nor a program expert. Nor am I an epidemiologistalthough I have been guilty of association with some pretty good ones. I must therefore look upon this invitation as a result-or perhaps a repercussionof some critical remarks I made at the APHA meeting two years ago concerning the Report of the President's Commission on Heart Disease, Cancer, and Stroke. ' 
Public Health Priorities
In that presentation and in a subsequently published magazine article2 I took issue with the commission over the criteria it used in assigning priority to those three disease areas-heart, cancer, and stroke. I thought the commission, in its selection of them as major causes of death in the United States, had not given enough weight to the question of the age at which death occurs. In terms of future years of life, and of future productivity at stake, I contended that deaths in the perinatal period in general and deaths caused by congenital anomalies in particular were of greater relative significance than would appear from a simple comparison of the absolute number of these deaths with the number of deaths from heart disease, cancer, and stroke. I expressed a concern that "crash" programs in these latter areas of disease could The concept of organizing programs of exemplary patient care on a regional basis is not without precedent. An important prototype was developed in this country by the National Foundation which, starting in 1950, authorized a series of grants to establish programs of regional respiratory and rehabilitation centers for poliomyelitis patients. During the next ten years, 17 such centers were established with National Foundation support in teaching hospitals associated with medical schools. These centers had an over-all bed capacity of 352 and ranged from 13 to 85 beds in each. Between June, 1950, when the first regional center began operations, until the close of 1960, the centers admitted over 6,000 poliomyelitis inpatients. In all, the number of inpatient days totaled nearly one million, an average of 160 days per patient. The entire cost of the program through the close of 1960 came to $35.8 million. Nearly $8 million of this total was met by National Foundation grants in support of the 17 centers, and the balance of $27.8 million was paid as direct costs of inpatient care. Nearly three-fifths of these direct costs were defrayed by local chapters of the National Foundation.
While these regional programs were minuscule in comparison with those envisaged for heart disease, cancer, and stroke, several aspects of their operations provide useful models for current consideration. In particular, they demonstrated the crucial interrelationship of patient care, teaching, and clinical research in disease areas characterized by a life-threatening acute onset, often followed by a protracted and difficult convalescence and rehabilitation.
The experience of the regional respiratory and rehabilitation centers for poliomyelitis patients showed that the opportunity for clinical research and teaching on a continuing basis could best be provided by concentrating these postacute patients in groups, in centers that could also care for acute, critically-ill patients.3 Staffs in centers were thus assured uninterrupted experience with the complete spectrum of the severe forms of poliomyelitis. Within this system, care, clinical research, and teaching were necessarily unified. The necessity was mother to an invention that proved highly advantageous in many other areas of clinical operation.
Basic to the entire system was the fact that these centers operated on institutional grants from the foundation. There is anotlher source of concern over the researclh potential of the Regional Medical Programs, and that is the risk that local political pressures may distort the composition of these programs. It is all wvell and good to encourage innovation and action at the local level in so far as service to patients VOL. 58. NO The planning and sponsorship of research-particularly fundamental research at the wellspring level of medical discovery-are activities in which we of the voluntary health agencies believe the nation would stand to lose more than it can gain through a complete takeover by the federal government. Maximum creativity requires minimal interference. I have not the time here to recount to you the many fascinating examples of how our National Foundation grantees surpassed all expectations when they were given complete freedom of movement, and how the organization itself did the same thing because, being voluntary in nature, it too has possessed this tremendous advantage. And I might add that we are not alone in our misgivings as to what might happen to this freedom if the voluntary agencies were forced out of business by the federal monolith. Among those who agree with us have been some top-level research administrators in the service of the United States Government.
Obviously, organizations like ours cannot, and never will, compete with tax money as a source of support for research grantees. To make matters worse, qualified manpower for the kind of work that is most urgently needed is in terribly short supply. And I am sorry to add that the federal government has already gone so far in attracting to itself manpower of this caliber that many large private foundations have already thrown up their hands and withdrawn from the field of scientific research.
I think this situation is shockingly myopic and costly-not only in terms of dollars but in the potential good that is beyond all price-the future creativity of research. To the degree that government now exercises restraint and avoids excesses, it can relieve itself of this onus. But I would point out that even for this, it is pretty late in the day.
